Abstract
The Indian perspectives on climate security are influenced by both domestic and international imperatives. The logic followed by India is not typically the same as that adopted by countries of the Global North. India’s discourses on the interconnections between climate change and security are largely conditioned by developmental priorities (domestic) and geopolitical pressures (international), which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In this context, the article contextualises India’s climate security narratives at the intersection of domestic and international/foreign-policy realms, involving different actors, including academia and think tanks, the government and its agencies, the military and non-governmental organisations. It argues that there has been a gradual process of integrating climate change into the domestic security policy-making agenda in the country, with the growing recognition of worsening climate vulnerabilities, while demonstrating reluctance to engage with the existing climate security discourses at the international level. It analyses the ways in which the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ intermingle with each other to shape India’s discourses and practices on climate security by categorising them into two dimensions – domestic–international and international–domestic.
Introduction
The widespread acknowledgement of climate change as an international, national and human security issue has led to the incorporation of climate change in many countries’ foreign-policy-making and security strategies, especially that of member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Climate security (or security implications of climate change) is usually linked with a host of threats/risks including the disrupting effects of climate change on societies and economies, conflicts over scarce or degraded resources, population displacement and mobility patterns related to climate-related disasters, and erosion of resilience of communities (Odeyemi Citation2020). Climate security has also become an integral part of the agenda of several international and regional organisations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Vogler Citation2023). Within the UN system, the UN Climate Security Mechanism (UNCSM) was established in 2018 as a joint initiative between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, United Nations Environment Programme, later joined by the UN Department of Peace Operations ‘to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to more systematically analyze and address the linkages between climate change, peace and security’ (UNCSM 2022). The recognition of the security implications of climate change is seen not only as a response to the mounting body of evidence linking security and climate change, but also as a tactic to infuse a sense of urgency into global climate governance and accelerate climate action at the international, national and local levels.
In India, while the discourse(s) on climate security at the domestic level may be considered limited, there is an increasing acknowledgement of human and national security implications of climate change by various actors, such as academia and think tanks, the government and its agencies, and the military, among others. Many of these conceptualisations are however not reflected in the policy process adequately, as India has not fully formalised its security strategy (except in the case of its military doctrine) and when formal security discussions happen, they are usually dominated by conventional security challenges (Jayaram Citation2021a). Additionally, there has not been much research on the connections between climate change and security, aside from some peer-reviewed literature (Barthwal-Datta Citation2012; Sahu Citation2019) and grey literature produced by think tanks (IPCS Citation2022; IDSA Citation2011). What is also noteworthy is that India is one of the countries that, up until 2023, have opposed any efforts to give the UNSC the authority to intervene in any climate change-related decision-making processes, implying its reservations about the climate security narratives in the international milieu. This includes voting against the first draft resolution on climate security in December 2021, when India was a non-permanent member in the council (Mitra Citation2021).
In this context, the article first provides an analytical framework through which the research puzzle is disentangled, examining the shifts in India’s international and domestic discourses on climate security – analysing how and why these distinct domestic and international dimensions interact with each other. The first section refers to literature that explains interactions between the foreign and domestic policy-making in the field of International Relations. This framework would help analyse the reasons for India’s resistance to acknowledge climate security at the international level, despite increasing domestic concerns about climate change as well as the growing influence of international climate security discourses on India’s domestic narratives on the issue, thereby offering a relational analysis of India’s foreign and domestic policies on climate security. It then takes a deep-dive into the international and domestic policy discourses on climate security, involving the above-mentioned actors. Thereafter, it expounds the two dimensions of India’s climate security discourses – focussing upon the influence of India’s domestic factors on its international climate security discourses, and that of the international factors on domestic climate security discourses.
What also needs to be noted here is that in the absence of overt demonstrations of a climate security agenda in India, these linkages are built largely though secondary and grey literature (meant for policy consumption and at times involving knowledge co-production with policy communities), interviews with policy and security communities, and indirect references to climate change and security (such as through water security, food security, energy security, etc.) that can be found in policy/official documents. Hence, the article also provides an overview of policy research (conducted primarily by the country’s security policy community), institutions, critical issues and other factors that have an influence on India’s climate security discourses.
When it comes to India’s engagement with international platforms on climate security, the article primarily focusses on the UNSC, but also incorporates examples from other forums such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and regional organisations in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. The UNSC, since 2007, has assumed the lead in attempting to address climate-related security risks through open debates, high-level debates and ‘arria-formula’ meetings, albeit with limited policy impact (Maertens and Trombetta Citation2023). These regular debates have been sponsored mostly by industrialised countries, but also increasingly supported by least developed countries and island states. However, UNSC resolutions on climate security have been consistently blocked by Russia, a permanent (veto-wielding) member (Hardt Citation2021).
The UNFCCC is the apex UN entity tasked with the responsibility of tackling climate change. The recognition of climate-conflict linkages and other human security implications of climate change by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) has led to greater emphasis on these issues in the UNFCCC discussions, particularly in relation to refugee movement, human well-being and disasters – with references to conflicts in countries such as Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine (UNFCCC Citation2022). However, climate security is not yet institutionalised as a part of the UNFCCC’s mandate as also seen by its absence in the UNCSM. The UNCSM, on the other hand, is a more of a knowledge-producing and capacity-building platform that brings together analysts and practitioners to build capacities within the UN to address climate-related security risks, and not a decision-making and/or enforcement body (UNCSM 2022).
‘Domestic’ and ‘international’ realms in climate security discourses
The literature on foreign-policy-making has long engaged with notions of how domestic politics influences foreign policy and vice versa. Within this literature, the two-level game theoretic model is one of the oft-used frameworks for analysing the interplay between the domestic and international dynamics (Putnam Citation1988). While much of the literature has focussed upon domestic determinants of foreign policy, there is a significant body of work that has also looked into the effects of the international system on domestic politics, which is referred to as ‘the second image reversed’ by Gourevitch (Citation1978). According to Gourevitch (Citation1978, 882–883), ‘the distribution of power among the states’ and the ‘distribution of economic activity and wealth’ (apart from ‘ideas’) influence domestic regimes and policy-making.
The two-level game theoretic model has been used in multiple studies to analyse the positions of different states. For instance, international bargaining processes of parties such as the EU, the United States (US) and Russia have been linked with domestic constraints, including the politics of ratification (Lisowski Citation2002; Mukhia Citation2018; Milkoreit Citation2019). Recent literature concerning India’s climate policy/diplomacy has also focussed on the role of ideas and interests in shaping it by intertwining domestic and international factors – without necessarily engaging with the two-level game model (Dubash et al. Citation2018; Sengupta Citation2019; Jayaram Citation2021b). For instance, Dubash et al. (Citation2018) highlight internalisation of India’s international climate pledges and the impacts of India’s discourses on integration of development with climate change at the domestic level on its international policies.
When it comes to climate security, some studies analyse the international and domestic discourses on climate security of specific countries, but largely treat them as separate realms of decision-making. For instance, developed countries like the United Kingdom (UK) tend to externalise climate security, combining traditional and human security concerns, and emphasising ‘adaptation and resilience, particularly for countries and regions deemed acutely vulnerable to climatic and political upheaval’ (Harrington Citation2023, 295). On the other hand, for most developing countries, the domestic framings of climate security are influenced by development imperatives with greater emphasis on poverty reduction, equitable access to resources (energy, water, etc.), socio-economic well-being, including by providing employment opportunities and protecting the most vulnerable populations, etc. (Ouweneel and Simpson Citation2023).
However, the lack of engagement with international–domestic interactions in the existing climate security literature eludes a holistic understanding of climate security approaches espoused by states, especially when it comes to exploring questions of why states like India adopt a position at one level despite having contrarian discourses at the other level. Similarly, the existing literature focusses more on the Global North and tends to externalise climate security as a problem of the Global South, wherein the agency of domestic and foreign-policy-making processes of countries in the Global South is overlooked. The climate security discourses of the US, UK, Germany, France and many other countries of the Global North typically reflect this notion, whereby conflicts or migration associated with climate change in the Global South affect security and stability of the Global North (Von Lucke Citation2020; Harrington Citation2023; Estève Citation2023). Hence, there is also a need to delve into the contextual meanings and practices of climate security in the Global South. The purpose of this article is to locate and analyse the evolution of India’s (a developing country) positions on climate security at the international level vis-à-vis the domestic discourses. It provides a relational analysis of India’s positions on climate security at the international and domestic levels; and analyses the influence of domestic factors on its foreign policy and that of the international factors on its domestic policy.
The other aspect of climate security that needs to be highlighted further is the historicity attached to these discourses that are influenced by colonial legacies and development inequities that are often overlooked in the climate security literature. A deeper engagement with postcolonial critiques of both the climate change and security discourses offers a reflexive representation and conceptualisation of climate security discourses in many countries. Herein, a lens that does not necessarily see national, human and other formulations of security as distinct or mutually exclusive assumes significance. Therefore, this article will also contribute to a pluralistic understanding of climate security from a Global South perspective that is currently limited.
Indian perspectives on international climate security discourses
India’s positions on the existing climate security narratives globally have been a mixed bag. It has remained opposed to discussing security implications of climate change in the UNSC, one of the international platforms that has been at the forefront of discussing climate-related security risks/threats. In 2021, when a draft resolution to acknowledge climate security risks was introduced, the Indian representative to the UN, T. S. Tirumurti (UNSC Citation2021), asserted:
India is second to none when it comes to climate action and climate justice. But the UN Security Council is not the place to discuss either issue. In fact, the attempt to do so appears to be motivated by a desire to evade responsibility in the appropriate forum and divert the world’s attention from an unwillingness to deliver where it counts…To move forward decisively, affordable access to climate finance and technologies has become critical. Developed countries must provide climate finance of $1 trillion at the earliest. It is necessary that climate finance be tracked with the same diligence as climate mitigation. And the reality … is that the developed countries have fallen well short of their promises. This is particularly important to recognize because today’s attempt to link climate with security really seeks to obfuscate lack of progress on critical issues under the UNFCCC process. This draft resolution would only sow the seeds of discord among the larger UN membership. It sends a wrong message to the developing countries that instead of addressing their concerns and holding developed countries responsible for meeting their commitments under the UNFCCC, we are willing to be divided and side-tracked under the guise of security. This draft resolution is a step backward from our collective resolve to combat climate change. It seeks to hand over that responsibility to a body which neither works through consensus nor is reflective of the interests of the developing countries. India had no option but to vote against.
The Indian position in the UNSC is guided by several factors, including the belief that the global nature of the climate change issue diverges with ‘security’ that is seen as being constrained by territorial boundaries, thereby rendering securitisation of climate change an unviable solution (Chaudhury Citation2020). Another argument given by the Indian representatives belonging to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is the apparent lack of or the ‘contested’ nature of evidence for climate-conflict nexus (through causal mechanisms) (UNSC Citation2019). For instance, in the 2007 open discussion on climate security in the UNSC, the Indian representative (diplomat) argued that poverty, energy competition and a lack of development—rather than climate change—were what caused conflicts (UNSC Citation2007).
Importantly, for India, the UNSC is an unrepresentative forum that is not fit for discussing climate change, considering it has only 15 member states with five permanent ones possessing veto power (Jayaram Citation2023b). Ruchira Kamboj, India’s first woman Permanent Representative to the UN stated in 2022 that India’s opposition to discussing climate security in the UNSC was ‘based on principles’ (PTI Citation2022). India contends that the UNFCCC and other more representative UN agencies should deal with climate change, thereby also emphasising the need for ‘a broader approach, anchored in development, adaptive capacity, risk assessment and institutional build-up’, rather than a securitised or militarised approach (UNSC Citation2011; UNSC Citation2019). For instance, there are concerns over the risk of sanctions against non-performing countries, aimed at coercing them into adopting more climate commitments than they are prepared to undertake domestically (Scott Citation2015). This also raises questions over whether such coercive measures would be applied only to the less powerful, non-veto countries, while veto-wielding ones (that are also the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters) might still get away.
Concerns of coercion are also closely connected with India’s scepticism regarding principles such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which implies (humanitarian) intervention, indicative of militarisation (Abdenur and Folly Citation2020). India argued against invoking R2P in the case of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, while many Western countries leaned towards it when the Myanmar regime refused entry to foreign aid workers and relief material in the aftermath of the cyclone (Singh Citation2020). India has expressed concerns about the effects of R2P on nations’ ‘sovereignty’, the UNSC’s involvement in interventions (especially when it remains unreformed), and certain states’ unilateral actions such as sanctions (Aneja Citation2014; Singh Citation2020).
For India, the UNFCCC plays an influential part in defining its climate security discourses at the international level (Jayaram Citation2023b). For example, one cannot overlook a general mistrust of the industrialised countries’ intentions (stemming from the North-South tensions). The industrialised countries’ ‘historical responsibility’ and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) are inflexible for India (Jayaram Citation2021b; Sengupta Citation2019). India’s statements in the earlier UNSC discussions indicate a sense of concern that financial and technological resources (overseas development assistance) from rich nations intended for development projects and poverty eradication could be diverted towards climate mitigation (UNSC Citation2007). Although this sentiment has considerably softened with greater support for climate action domestically over time, scepticism over climate security-related discussions in international organisations is palpable. In the UNFCCC too, India has consistently stressed on ‘additionality’, whereby ‘funds raised for climate change should not substitute or divert funds from other important developmental objectives, particularly social and economic development’ (Mandal Citation2019, 382).
The politics of climate change is at times linked with the strategic timing of the 2007 UNSC meeting, the first time that climate change was introduced in the UNSC. Thereafter, the UN General Assembly (UNGA), a more representative forum (at least when it comes to the system of ‘one country, one vote’), unanimously adopted a resolution on ‘Climate change and its possible security implications’ (UNGA Citation2009a). It released a report of the Secretary-General later in the same year, reinforcing the 2007 meeting’s climate security agenda, even while recognising the UNFCCC as the apex climate change-related decision-making body (UNGA Citation2009b). These developments raise questions about the intentions of the industrialised countries, especially amidst the 2007–2009 financial crisis that reduced even further their willingness to contribute to climate finance required by developing countries (Jalles Citation2023). The 2007 meeting took place just ahead of the Bali climate summit, wherein the strict differentiation between the developed and developing countries (as operationalised in the Kyoto Protocol) was somewhat diluted, culminating in the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen Summit to reach an agreement (Jayaram Citation2021b). Hence, this could have been seen by India as a strategic move by the industrialised countries to force countries such as India to adopt legally binding emissions reduction targets (Jayaram Citation2023b).Footnote1
Apart from the global narratives, regional dynamics also have an impact on India’s discourses. To start with, narratives of inter-state/cross-border ‘climate migration’ and ‘climate refugees’ exemplify traditional notions of security, as in the political discourse, ‘illegal immigration’ from Bangladesh to India is connected to climate change-related disasters and resource competition, with socio-economic and political repercussions for India (Chowdhary Citation2020; Bose Citation2014). Even though most policy experts assert that climate change is unlikely to cause new conflicts, they also reiterate that it may exacerbate existing insecurities, thereby adopting the threat multiplier logic (IDSA Citation2011; Dasgupta Citation2016; Saran Citation2019; IPCS Citation2022). For instance, variations in river water levels (induced by climate change) could affect transboundary river water management with Pakistan and China over the sharing of the Indus and the Brahmaputra, respectively, with whom India shares geopolitically hostile relations (Klare Citation2020; Sahu and Mohan Citation2022; Jayaram and Sethi Citation2022b). Indian think tanks, while shaping climate security narratives, have also identified regional issues such as glacial recession, sea level rise, and extreme weather events that could spark off different scenarios, including ‘civil wars’, ‘military invasion’, ‘economic migration’ and ‘political refugees’ (Pai Citation2017). Similarly, in the maritime realm – Indian Ocean Region – climate security risks such as displacement and migration, maritime disputes (owing to climate impacts on low-lying islands), and potential conflicts over ‘Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and seabed resources’ have been discussed by serving and ex-military officials (Singh Citation2015).
Climate security is also contextualised in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region through the lens of cooperation. For instance, as a strategy of addressing climate change-related disasters, India coordinates with its neighbours and nations in the Indo-Pacific region, especially through Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations as well as pre-disaster HADR exercises aimed at strengthening disaster response capabilities. These efforts are integral to India’s soft power, tied to India’s aspiration to be seen as a net security provider in the region and a responsible power globally (The Print Citation2022; Gong and Jayaram Citation2023). Similarly, India has also been cooperating with the other countries of the region through regional organisations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) – all of which identify climate change as an area of cooperation (Jayaram Citation2022a). India engages with security groupings such as the Quad (involving the US, Japan, Australia, and India) closely. The Quad recognises risks posed by climate change to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and has launched the ‘Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package’ (Q-CHAMP) and finalised the guidelines for ‘Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific’ (The White House Citation2021; The White House Citation2022).
Domestic discourses on climate security in India
Domestically, India’s perceptions of climate security are not necessarily tied to the framings of climate security at the international level, barring a few exceptions. The discourses on development heavily influence the Indian perspectives on climate security, which contrasts it with the Western and/or Global North schools of thinking on climate security. The recognition of security implications of climate change plays out mostly through an assessment of the threats posed by climate change to the country’s economic development. If one draws upon the securitisation framework of the Copenhagen School, it could be argued that India has securitised climate change by emphasising these threats and adopting ‘emergency’ policy and institutional measures such as enacting the 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) and establishing the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change (PMCCC) in late 2000s (Sahu Citation2019). Similar arguments have been made by Barthwal-Datta (Citation2012), according to whom climate change is securitised in India by non-state actors like ‘scientific policy communities’ that act as ‘securitising actors’ apart from the state. Organisations such as The Energy and Resources Institute and the Centre for Science and Environment have been instrumental in preparing the NAPCC, thereby being involved in the securitisation process on account of their ‘social capital’ and ‘expert authority’ (Barthwal-Datta Citation2012).
India’s policies at the intersection of climate change and security draw upon water security, food security, energy security and livelihood security, which are linked with development issues. The underlying causes of harm or insecurity are taken into account by merging various issues. For instance, India has prioritised food security since the Green Revolution was launched in 1960s, including by enacting the National Food Security Act, 2013, which focusses more on socio-economic aspects of access and affordability (DFPD Citation2013). A certain constitutive logic, coupled with India’s agrarian identity, which links the issue with economic security dimensions as well (Chattopadhyay Citation2010; Das and Ansari Citation2021), brings out the ways in which the risk of erosion of developmental gains caused by climate change is emphasised. For instance, Chauhan (Citation2009, 3) highlights the threats posed by climate change-related disasters to poverty reduction, development and economic growth.
Similarly, on water security, increasing scarcity to the point where certain big cities could potentially experience a ‘day zero’ disaster (when taps run completely dry) has also underscored the need for incorporating climate considerations into water security-related policies across the country (Suneja Citation2019). India’s 2012 National Water Policy mentions ‘the possibility of deepening water conflicts among different user groups’ over water owing to constraints posed by the growing population and energy demand, coupled with climate change (MWR Citation2012). In 2018–19, the metropolitan city of Chennai faced a ‘day zero’ situation, when its taps ran dry and people had to stand in queues for hours to collect water from public and private tankers. It also resulted in conflicts between urban and rural water users (Guntoju, Faiz Alam, and Sikka Citation2019). Similarly, river water sharing conflicts among the Indian states (for example, the Cauvery/Kaveri dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu) could be affected by climate change as it exacerbates water scarcity concerns in combination with other factors such as urbanisation (Sharma, Hipel, and Schweizer Citation2020).
On the other hand, many critical voices have resisted linking climate change with security or emergency domestically. This stems from the interlinkages built between development and climate security in terms of the negative impacts of climate mitigation on development priorities. Ramesh (Citation2015), former Minister of State (MoS, Independent Charge), Ministry of Environment and Forests (now Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change or MoEFCC), stated that the ministry is often branded ‘anti-people’ as it is seen to be obstructing economic progress for ecological reasons. According to Ramesh (Citation2015), neither ecological security nor development (and employment opportunities) can be guaranteed at the expense of one another. This sentiment has been consistently espoused by all the administrations. India’s current MoS, MoEFCC, Bhupender Yadav, states, ‘India’s climate policy is directed towards sustainable development and poverty eradication while striving continuously to decouple emissions from growth and achieve energy efficiency across sectors’ (PIB Citation2023). In practice, unless it is related to the sustainable development agenda, climate action (especially mitigation) is generally seen as partially damaging to the country’s developmental priorities (Dubash et al. Citation2018). At the policy level, these narratives are used to rationalise building capacities and acquiring financial and technological resources through economic growth and development as the only pathway towards stronger climate action, rather than securitising climate change (Dasgupta Citation2013).
India’s perspectives of climate security in the domestic (non-governmental) realm are guided by a distinct Indian environmental philosophy, steered by ‘environmentalism of the poor.’ Herein, justice is a crucial consideration, whether it is about conflicts over natural resource management or survival itself. The ecological imperative is one among several other goals of environmental conservation (Shiva Citation2009) and climate action. For instance, energy transition, aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, would also help achieve energy security, thereby combining the ‘co-benefits’ of both climate and energy security (Bisht Citation2012; Dubash Citation2013; Ramesh Citation2015). In addition, the security implications of energy transition (such as conflicts over land use and impacts on livelihoods) are also increasingly being discussed, thereby pushing for a just transition agenda, which is yet again being steered by both state and non-state actors, such as think tanks and research institutions (Banerjee Citation2021).
In the absence of an official (publicly available) national security strategy, the Indian establishment’s views on security are generally captured in publications produced by, or statements made by, political, bureaucratic, and non-governmental policy/academic communities (who work closely with the government in an advisory capacity). For instance, in India’s National Security Annual Review 2015–2016, the late Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, one of India’s most experienced negotiators in the UNFCCC processes and a former member of the PMCCC, highlighted climate change as a non-traditional security challenge and ‘threat multiplier’ (Dasgupta Citation2016). This review is published by the Foundation for National Security Research, a think tank in New Delhi and typically contains essays by experts working on various aspects of ‘national security,’ including members of the National Security Council (NSC) and/or National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), who provide advice to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). However, since 2018, the think tank has not published the annual reviews, and the PMCCC has not met since 2015, after it was reconstituted by the newly elected government in 2014 (Sangomala Citation2021). Furthermore, ‘Resource, Water and Food Security’ was formerly on the NSAB’s agenda (Bolton Citation2017), particularly between 2010 and 2015, and it examined the effects of climate change on national security, primarily in terms of resource availability. Devendra Kumar Sharma, member of the NSAB (since 2021) and Chairman, Himachal Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission, has looked into the effects of climate change on transboundary rivers such as the Indus (with the view of revising the Indus Waters Treaty signed between India and Pakistan), among other issues concerning water management, in his articles (Sharma Citation2023). This lack of continuity and consistency renders the task of analysing India’s climate security perspectives difficult.
The 2017 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces labels climate change as a ‘non-traditional security’ issue, with potential implications for migration/displacement, disaster response, civil strife etc., thereby necessitating ‘security’ responses (HQ-IDS Citation2017). This in a way reflects the changing perceptions of climate change by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) through a security lens. Several serving and ex-military personnel have also contributed to climate security discourses at the policy level. For instance, Lieutenant General (retired) Vinod G. Khandare (an ex-Indian Army officer), Military Advisor in the NSC Secretariat under the PMO (2018–2021) and Principal Adviser in the MoD (since 2022), emphasises the need to consider climate and broader environmental issues in threat assessment matrix and security planning. He highlights threats posed by weather modification and similar geoengineering techniques, climate migration and other transboundary climate security concerns to India’s securityFootnote2. Similarly, a report on climate security in India published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), an Indian think tank, in partnership with the Clingendael Institute, a Dutch think tank, based on input provided by governmental and non-governmental actors (including military ones), states, ‘Climate change effects can create the conditions for conflict by aggravating intermediate ‘stressors’, whether they are social, political, and/or economic’ (IPCS Citation2022).Footnote3 Hence, the conflict potential of climate change, albeit not endorsed in formal policy process, has become a part of the climate discourses in the country.
The Indian military is increasingly becoming aware of climate security risks for its operations and strategies. Chauhan highlights the threats posed by climate risks such as rising sea level, cyclones and storm-surges to the Indian Navy’s naval bases and installations. He also brings out the indirect impacts of climate change on ‘the ability of the navy to carry out its operations owing to rising air and ocean temperatures, changes in salinity, as also oceanic oxygen depletion and the increase in bioluminescent algae blooms, ocean acidification and changes in ambient underwater noise, etc.’Footnote4 Similarly, Air Marshal (retired) Anil Chopra explains the impact of high temperatures on load carriage for aircraft and sensitive avionics as well as underscores the contribution of the armed forces to global greenhouse gas emissions (Chopra Citation2023).
A relational analysis of India’s discourses on climate security
Domestic–international dimension
This section further substantiates the influence of domestic factors on India’s international positioning on climate security. In the UNSC and other international forums that discuss climate security, or even broadly climate change, India has consistently drawn upon climate justice and North-South discourses, such as during its G-20 presidency in 2023 (Saxena Citation2023; Hurrell and Sengupta Citation2012). For instance, Chaturvedi and Doyle (Citation2015, 77), being critical of the existing Western climate security discourses, observe that the notions of climate security used in the West do not reflect the realities of the Global South that has faced the brunt of climate change. They argue that the Western discourses do not even distinguish between luxury emissions and survival emissions, where the former are linked to developed countries and the latter to developing ones (Chaturvedi and Doyle Citation2015, 153). Boas (Citation2014) points out that rather than focussing on issues of national or international security, the Indian perspective on climate change and security is informed by ideas of ‘human security’ and ‘energy security’. The ‘alarmist’ language on climate security, including on topics like climate migration, has long been resisted by India, which has viewed this discourse as ‘arrogant’ (Boas Citation2014) and a strategy employed by the Global North to pressure India to adopt emissions reduction obligations within the UNFCCC.
One of India’s major concerns is that ‘securitisation’ of climate change could lead to further vilification of coal, on which India’s energy security and development is highly dependent. 55% of India’s energy needs are still met by coal (MoC Citation2023). In such a scenario, as also exemplified by India’s move to advocate for ‘phase-down’ rather than ‘phase-out’ of coal at the 2021 Glasgow climate summit (Mohan Citation2021), India is apprehensive of additional pressure to phase out coal owing to involvement of international organisations such as the UNSC that has a history of playing interventionist politics (Chaudhury Citation2020). India is not yet prepared to abandon coal completely despite appreciating the additional benefits of climate action for energy security through renewable energy deployment (Kanitkar, Mythri, and Jayaraman Citation2022). Clearly, the domestic development imperatives influence India’s positioning on climate security on international platforms such as the UNSC.
Linking climate security with mitigation commitments has been a dilemma for India, considering its position on mitigation commitments has been contingent on the need to maintain autonomy, which is to keep domestic climate action independent of international dynamics and the pressure to act more (Saran Citation2008; Jayaram Citation2021b). In the 2007 open debate in the UNSC, the Indian representative categorically said that developing countries’ emissions posed no threat to global peace and security, and that it was the responsibility of wealthier nations to lower their own (UNSC Citation2007). In theory, this is a position taken by all the developing and least developed countries. However, compared to the majority of other developing, least developed and island countries for which these vulnerabilities are at the centre of their climate policy, which also invariably has an impact on their perceptions of security itself, India’s immense physical vulnerability to climate change has not significantly influenced its positions, either in the climate change negotiations or in the UNSC (Jayaram Citation2021b). India’s international climate policy has mostly focussed upon a low-carbon development strategy with the intention of being recognised as a ‘responsible power’ rather than an obstacle in international climate cooperation, especially within the UNFCCC processes (Sengupta Citation2019).
International–domestic dimension
In this section, the influence of international factors on domestic discourses and policies on climate change are discussed in more detail. Yet again, transnational climate justice and North–South disparities in terms of both development and climate vulnerabilities are critical to this dimension. For instance, the concept of ‘environmental colonialism’ used by Agarwal and Narain (Citation2019) to describe the climate change negotiations supports a longstanding mistrust of Western-centric discourses on the subject. They highlight that these discourses lean towards ‘one worldism’ and ‘high minded internationalism’ in the name of ‘morality’. The postcolonial worldviews, with their impact on the development and environmental paradigms espoused by countries such as India, are at the centre of climate security narratives too. For India, in the post-independence era, development was a pathway towards maintaining sovereignty (protect the country from foreign interference), building a modern identity (drawing upon Western notions of modernity and industrial development), and lifting millions out of people of poverty (attributed to the colonial experience) (Sirohi Citation2019, 67–111). This Global North-driven development paradigm, while contributing to these efforts, has also been responsible for socio-ecological destruction in various places (Chatterjee Citation2019).
In fact, ‘historicisation’ of environmental security (Zwierlein Citation2017) and postcolonial interpretations of ‘ecological security’ (Jayaram Citation2023a) could provide a more nuanced understanding of the prevailing climate security discourses both in the Global North and Global South. One needs to move beyond the post-second world war and post-cold war narratives of growing ecological consciousness and redefining/broadening security respectively. There is also a need to problematise the evolution of meanings of ‘nature’ and ‘security’ that have been heavily influenced by the dominant ideologies of ‘imperial economies’ and concepts of ‘nation state’ that were hallmarks of the colonial era (Zwierlein Citation2017). Many Indian scholars such as Swami (Citation2003), Gadgil and Guha (Citation2004), Prakash (Citation2006), Rajan (Citation2006), Gupta (Citation2009) and Saravanan (Citation2023) have provided extensive accounts of large-scale socio-ecological destruction caused by the colonial (British) empire in India, thereby calling for separating the Indian variant of environmentalism from the ‘post-industrial’ and ‘post-material’ Western interpretations of environmentalism (Gadgil and Guha Citation2004).
In spite of these efforts to develop counter-narratives on environmental and climate change issues, concepts such as climate-resilient development (often used in the climate security literature) and low-carbon development (specifically targeted at climate mitigation) have received greater traction in India as climate vulnerabilities grow and the willingness to engage with and adopt the normative approaches of global climate governance (Sengupta Citation2019; Singh and Chudasama Citation2021). For instance, a report on climate change, peace and security, published by Kubernein Initiative, a geopolitical advisory/think tank in India, in partnership with adelphi, a Berlin-based think tank/consultancy, recommends community and infrastructural resilience in climate security practices in India and broader South Asia (KI and adelphi Citation2024).Footnote5 With greater international pressure to commit to emissions reduction and to be seen as a responsible power, the political and public acceptance for these norms and approaches has grown domestically. Yet, although major international organisations embrace the language of climate security, resilience and similar concepts, there are still gaps on the domestic front in India, when it comes to diffusion of these norms, considering the complexity of issues that operate at multiple scales in a non-linear and systemic manner (Unnikrishnan and Nagendra Citation2021). Similarly, despite the growing rhetorical acceptance of ‘threat multiplier’ and ‘risk multiplier’ discourses, their domestic policy impact remains negligible (Jayaram Citation2021a; Dasgupta 2016).
Conclusion
Within India’s security discourses and architectures, climate security remains under-conceptualised. Yet, there is a growing acknowledgement of the interlinkages between climate change and security. Although Western/Global North narratives such as the ‘threat multiplier’ logic and conflict-centric framings influence some of the domestic discourses on climate security, the larger objective has been to distance from the Western narratives and outline a climate security narrative that could be contextualised in the Indian case, as stressed by think tanks such as the IPCS. At the same time, India’s positions in various multilateral forums such as the UNSC goes beyond the conceptualisations of climate security to reflect upon the geopolitical complexities involved in addressing climate security.
The relational analytical (international and domestic) approach used in this article explains the various ways in which India’s perspectives on climate security are constructed through different processes, facilitated by several actors (and not just the state). While India’s positions on climate security internationally are not entirely reflective of its domestic discourses, in the absence of a formal security strategy, it is also difficult to scrutinise its domestic policies on climate change through a security lens. Climate security remains a non-institutionalised realm in the Indian context owing to the contradictions within the discourses climate security as well as India’s own balancing act between development and climate action.
However, it is also evident that India’s inability to redefine security in a systematic manner, despite increasingly invoking non-traditional security framings to define issues such as climate change at the domestic level, has served as a deterrent to a clearly identifiable climate security policy domestically. Nevertheless, with newly emerging geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region and India’s burgeoning regional engagement on climate change (including through a security lens), India could be pushed further to integrate climate security into its foreign-policy approaches. It is also important to acknowledge that the security framings depend on the actors. Even if certain non-governmental actors and the military (and to a lesser extent the MoD) may be seen as more willing to examine climate security, many government actors such as the Ministry of Coal (MoC), MoEFCC and MEA (and increasingly the PMO) do not seem to be on the same page.
To sum up, the relational analysis reveals the interactions between the international and domestic discourses of climate security espoused by India – providing the rationale for varied positions on the issue at the domestic and international levels. As much as the constraining domestic factors lead to its reluctant international positioning on the issue (by the state), one could still discern the diffusion of international climate security discourses into the Indian domestic ones, channelised through different actors (beyond the state) and shaped by domestic imperatives. Through a strong empirical focus, describing and contextualising the case of India, this article has explained the nuances of the construction of climate security discourses and practices in the Global South, which have often been overlooked by global discourses that are tilted towards Western notions of climate security.
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